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REVIEW ESSAYS

the plurality of american war

John T. Kuehn

Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial
Era to the Twenty-First Century, by Matthew S. Muehlbauer
and David J. Ulbrich. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2017. 516
pages. $74.95.

Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich have produced an admirable text
built around Russell Weigley’s framework in his now classic American Way of
War.1 The occasion for this review is the release of an updated, second edition of
this work. As mentioned, the book clearly seems designed as a text, specifically for
an upper-level undergraduate course, but possibly
for graduate-level seminars on American military
Dr. John T. Kuehn is a professor of military history
at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Colhistory as well. Accordingly, this review assesses
lege (CGSC). He retired from the U.S. Navy in 2004
the book on the basis of that pedagogical design.
at the rank of commander after twenty-three years
The authors’ study is primarily narrative in naof service as a naval flight officer. He has taught a
variety of subjects at CGSC since 2000. He authored
ture, but never far from the flow of facts, figures,
Agents of Innovation (Naval Institute Press, 2008),
A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the faces, and the occasional military fiasco hangs the
Samurai to the 21st Century (Praeger, 2014), and authors’ overarching thematic argument: there
Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the
is no one American way of war, but rather many
Great Campaigns (Praeger, 2015), and coauthored
Eyewitness Pacific Theater (Sterling, 2008) with D. ways, determined by a complex interaction of
M. Giangreco. He was awarded a Moncado Prize
factors and institutions. They have updated this
from the Society for Military History in 2011. His lataspect of the book in an expanded introduction
est book from the Naval Institute Press is America’s
to the second edition, but its fundamental claim
First General Staff: A Short History of the Rise and
Fall of the General Board of the Navy, 1900–1950 remains unchanged (pp. 5–6). The student or pro(2017).
fessor wanting one-stop shopping for these ways of
war will be rewarded here.
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The sheer scope of the text is impressive, yet it does not descend overmuch
into the weeds of battles and military trivia, instead remaining focused on how
conflict involving Americans, and not just European Americans, has evolved
over the years. Nonetheless, the narrative does start—as advertised in the title—
with the mass arrival of “modern” Europeans on the North American continent
during the sixteenth century. However, that is preceded by cogent contextual
discussions of native warfare prior to the arrival of the Europeans; the so-called
military revolution in early modern Europe; and necessary discussions of tactics,
technology, and logistics. In other words, the authors do a fine job of setting up
the in-place “initial conditions” for the continuum of conflict that follows. This
is good news for novices to these debates, since it gives them, up front, an understanding of the key definitions and concepts used throughout the text. Another
welcome discussion is that covering the “levels of war.” All too often Americans,
and readers and writers of military history specifically, are two-dimensional in
their thinking about war as just tactics and strategy (pp. 4–5). The operational
level of warfare and the higher level of policy beyond military strategy often are
disregarded in instruction and writing on these matters beyond what one might
find in esoteric discussions of military doctrine.
As for the narrative itself, in something of such broad scope the biases and
preferences of the authors are almost inescapable. But they tend to succeed in
achieving their aim of using the most updated scholarship to avoid perpetuating the tired myths and unchallenged legends that make up so much of what
sometimes is called popular American military history. However, no one author,
or two, can be expected to get it all completely correct, or agreeable, as if such a
thing is even possible. The purpose of this review is not to catalog all those places
where the authors’ narrative differs from the reviewer’s interpretation of things,
especially causation. A larger understanding of history includes such arguments
about the past, but the purpose of this study is more of an ongoing refinement
rather than a final word.
However, one minor error that occurs in the last chapter is worth correction.
The authors claim that the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of
1986 delineated as follows: “The chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS] . . .
assumed a new position in the operational chain of command: Theater commanders reported to the chairman, who then reported to the president” (p.
468). Goldwater-Nichols does make the CJCS the “principal military adviser to
the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense,” but
under §211 it states: “CHAIN OF COMMAND.—Unless otherwise directed by
the President, the chain of command to a unified [i.e., regional or theater] or
specified combatant command runs—(1) from the President to the Secretary of
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Defense; and (2) from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command” (emphasis added).2 In other words, the CJCS is simply the
principal military adviser, and civilian control over regional or global combatant
commanders is absolute and does not include the chairman.
That quibble aside, many of the accounts listed here are refreshing in the new
way in which they cast American conflict, in terms of both its political context,
owing to foreign and domestic factors, and what has been called the “war and
society” approach.
Finally, the later chapters in particular might be regarded as the starting point
for future conversations about events still ongoing and will serve instructors
and teachers well in engaging their students in debates about more-recent and
familiar events. The second edition takes the book up to the most recent times of
President Barack Obama’s second term and, particularly, includes a heavy critical component of the (still ongoing) so-called Global War on Terror as well as a
discussion of the impact of the neoconservative movement on the American way
of war (pp. 478–79, 490–95). These are welcome additions and fit nicely into the
overall construct of the book.
Historian N. A. M. Rodger recently wrote about Americans and history as
follows: “Our problem is not that we know too little history to understand the
present but that we know too much, and most of it is wrong.”3 Muehlbauer and
Ulbrich’s effort here goes a long way toward correcting that problem—if only
more people would read it. Highly recommended for all audiences, not only college undergraduate and graduate students.

NOTES

1.	See Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of
War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana Univ.
Press, 1973).
2.	Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
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99-433, §§201, 211, 100 Stat. 992, 1005, 1013
(1986).
3.	N. A. M. Rodger, “The Hattendorf Prize Lecture: The Perils of History,” Naval War College
Review 66, no. 1 (Winter 2013), p. 8.
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